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NOTES
Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment
in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings
The questions of the extent of an attorney's right to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination during bar disciplinary proceedings and of the consequences of the exercise of the privilege has
created a sharp division of opinion.1 The privilege against selfincrimination necessarily involves a conflict between the public's
interest in disclosure and the individual's interest in privacy and
nondisclosure. 2 However, the conflict is exacerbated when the individual claiming the privilege is entrusted with important public
responsibilities.
Attorney disciplinary proceedings, which are intended to maintain the high standards of the bar, are part of the over-all system of
state regulation of the practice of law.3 The state courts have traditionally been held to have an implied or inherent power to discipline
the attorneys who practice before them and who serve as officers of
their courts.4 Although at one time state supreme courts handled
I. Many commentators have been critical of the Supreme Court's extension in
Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), of the privilege against self-incrimination to
attorneys in disciplinary proceedings. See Cathey, The Fifth Amendment-Its Protec•
tion of the Right to Become and Remain a Lawyer, 21 ARK. L. R.Ev. 361 (1967); Cole,
Bar Discipline and Spevack v. Klein, 53 A.B.A.J. 819 (1967); Franck., The Myth of
Spevack v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968); Underwood, Fifth Amendment and the
Lawyer, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 129 (1967), A constitutional amendment excepting lawyers
in disciplinary proceedings from the protection of the fifth amendment has been
proposed by Cole, supra, and Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). Other writers have been more
receptive to Spevack. See, e.g., Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone
in Bar Discipline!, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1967). For a novel approach, see Buchanan, TIie

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: To What Extent Should It Protect a State Em•
ployee or Professional Licensee Against the Loss of His State-Created Status?, 'l HousroN
L. REv. 297 (1970).
2. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting), cited in E. GRISTHE FIFlll A.MEND?.mNT TonAY 8 (1955).
3. See Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 523-25 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Theard v.
United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.
1967). Disbarment from practice before the state courts does not automatically result
in disbarment from practice before the federal courts, although the state proceedings
are given great weight by the latter. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957),
Generally, when an attorney admitted in several jurisdictions is disciplined in one, his
right to practice elsewhere is unaffected in the absence of separate disciplinary proceedings in the other jurisdictions. See Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 S,2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
4. See, e.g., In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 363-64, 399 P.2d 865, 867 (1965); Ratterman
v. Stapleton, 371 S.W,2d 939, 940 (Ky, 1963): In re Connor, 207 S.W.2d 492, 494-95
(Mo. 1948) (court of appeals has sole power to admit and thus inherent power to
disbar; circuit court has no jurisdiction to disbar). See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871); Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965) (dictum):
Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir, 1927). Statutory provisions cannot limit
the court's inherent power to disbar. In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 413, 248 P. 29, 31 (1926),
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virtually all disciplinary matters themselves, in more recent times
the courts have taken the bar into partnership in disciplinary matters and delegated to it the responsibility for preliminary investigation and hearing. 5
There has been sharp resistance to the recognition of the attorney's right to remain silent in these proceedings.6 In Cohen v. Hurley,1 the Supreme Court let stand a New York disbarment based on an
attorney's refusal on self-incrimination grounds to allow examination
of records relating to his contingent fee cases or to testify at a general
investigation of ambulance chasing. Although the New York court's
interpretation of the state privilege was also involved, Cohen was
grounded in large part upon the then unavailability of the federal
privilege against self-incrimination in state proceedings. In Malloy
v. Hogan, 8 the Supreme Court changed its position and held that,
under the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination is also applicable to state proceedings; 9
but Cohen was not expressly overruled.
An act of the state legislature compelling the court to readmit an attorney was held
unconstitutional in In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 378, 240 N.W. 441, 443 (1932). See
generally SPECIAL CoMMITfEE ON EVALUATION OF l;>ISCIPLINARY ENFOR~N';t', AMERICAN
BAR AssoCIATION, PJ\OBLEMS AND RECOM?IIBNDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
§ II (1970) [hereinafter CLARK CoM?IU'ITEE REPoRTJ.
5. Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 161, 175 (1946). This is not entfrely a modern phenomenon, however. See, e.g., People ex rel. K;irlin v. Culkin, 248
N,Y. 465,480, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (1928): "In the long :run the power now conceded wjll
make for the health and honor of the profession and for the protection of the pubUc.
If the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for
strangers, to do the noisome work." ln many states there are several stages of investi~tion-first by a local bar grievance committee, then by a state bar committee, See
CLARK CoMllrnTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-38. If the charges are not dismissed at
either of these stages, the attorney under investigation must be given notice of the
charges and an opportunity to appear at a hearing. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (l968).
The initial stages of the proces$ are similar jn most states, but the degree of delegation
of power by the courts in the later stages varies from state to state. In some states the
entire procedure is administrative; the bar committee's findings and recommendations
made after the hearing are filed with the state supreme court and become final unless
the attorney petitions the supreme court for review. E.g., CAL, :Bus. &: PROF, CoDE
§§ 6078, 6081-8~ (West 1962); FLA. STATE :BA~ !m:EGRATION R. ll,06, 11.09, 32 FJ.,,.. STA.T.
ANN. (Supp. 1972). In other states, the bar committee must prosecute a suit to have
discipline imposed by the court. E.g., LA.. STATE :B.u AssN., ARnCI.Es OF ll'iCORP, ai:t. 15,
§ 6, 21.A. LA. R.Ev. CIV. STA.T. l\Nl'i, (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT, Com, §§ 27-14-05 to -06
(1960). ln some states this action is filed in the state supreme court, which refers the
case to a commissioner for an evjdentiary hearing and a recommendation, E.g.,
STATE BM AssN,, ARTICLES OF lNcoRP, art. 15, § 6(b), 21A LA, R.Ev. CIV, STAT, AN.N. (Supp.
1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-08 (1960). Other states preserve more unusual procedures; in Texas, for example, the attorney may still request a j1.1ry trial. TEX, R.Ev.
C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 5 (1959). In Iowa, the supreme court designates a threejudge panel to hear the case, and the attorney general prosecutes. IOWA- CODE ANN.
§§ 610.29-.30 (1950).
6. See note l supra.
7. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
8. 378 U.S. l (1964).
9. 378 U.S. at 10-11.
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In Spevack v. Klein, 10 decided just six years after Cohen, a divided
court did expressly overrule Cohen. It held that an attorney may not
be disbarred for exercising his privilege against self-incrimination in
a state disciplinary proceeding. In Spevack, a referee conducting an
investigation into ambulance chasing on behalf of the appellate division of the state court subpoenaed attorney Spevack's records of his
contingent fee cases. Because Spevack, relying on the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, refused to produce the
records or to testify, he was disbarred. Although the appellate division assumed that the privilege, if available, would be applicable to
the records, it found that the invocation of the privilege was grounds
for disbarment. 11 As a result, the Supreme Court would not consider
the question of whether the privilege applied to the records, but fo.
cused upon the question of whether invoking the privilege could be
the sole ground for disbarment.
New York had found that the invocation of the privilege conflicted with the attorney's duty to divulge all information pertinent to
his character and to his fitness to remain a member of the bar.12
Justice Douglas, writing for four members of the Supreme Court,
rejected this position on the grounds that (1) the privilege against
self-incrimination guaranteees the right to remain silent and to " 'suffer no penalty ... for such silence,' " 13 and (2) disbarment of an attorney who exercises this right is an impermissible penalty. 14 The
plurality stated that, for purposes of the fifth amendment privilege,
" 'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means ... the
imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege 'costly.' "15 Justice Fortas joined the plurality
in expressly rejecting the contention that the attorney's special responsibilities necessitated the imposition of certain limitations on
the privilege against self-incrimination.16 He differed from the plu10. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
11. The appellate division, relying on Cohen, held that a lawyer, like any citizen,
may invoke his privilege against self.incrimination and refuse to supply pertinent
information. In re Spevack, 24 App. Div. 2d 653 (1965). However, "when a lawyer docs
so be fails in his inherent duty to the court to divulge all pertinent information
necessary to show his character and fitness to remain a member of the Bar • • • ,"
24 App. Div. 2d at 654. The New York court of appeals affirmed, on the authority of
Cohen and "on the additional ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege docs not
apply to a demand, not for oral testimony, but that an attorney produce records re•
quired by law to be kept by him ••••" In re Spevack, 16 N,Y.2d 1048, 1050, 213 N.E,2d
457, 457-58, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 126 (1965).
12. 385 U.S. at 514, 516.
13. 385 U.S. at 514, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
14. 385 U.S. at 516.
15. 385 U.S. at 515, citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
16. The plurality opinion stated: "We find no room in the privilege against self•
incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to
others •••• Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U,S, 551
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rality only in that he distinguished the attorney's right to remain
silent from that of state employees and agents, which, he suggested,
should be more restricted because of the employees' undivided responsibility to the state.17 :
Justice Harlan, dissenting, felt that the majority's decision would
"be disheartening and frustrating to courts and bar associations
throughout the country in their efforts to maintain high standards
at the bar."18 He felt that the majority's approach was too absolutist19
and argued that the Court had traditionally determined the proper
scope of the privilege by weighing "the history and purposes of the
privilege, and the character and urgency of the other public interests ,
involved."20 He noted that the New York rules were reasonably calculated to serve the state's traditional and legitimate effort to ensure
the high standards of the bar.21 He suggested that Spevack be resolved
in accordance with cases that permit denial of a status or authoritysuch as a commission as a United States Army officer22-to one whose
claim of the privilege precludes assessment of his qualifications. 23
Justice White, also dissenting,24 felt that the attorney's interests
would be adequately protected by holding that disclosures made under threat of job loss are inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings, as was done in Spevack's companion case of Garrity v.
New ]ersey, 25 which involved the prosecution of police officers.26
In the following year the distinction between attorneys and state
employees drawn in Justice Fortas' concurrence in Spevack became
[(1956)], and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey, [385 U.S. 493 (1967)] lawyers also
enjoy first-class citizenship." 385 U.S. at 516.
17. According to this opinion, a lawyer is not an employee of the state, although
he is a licensee of the state and an officer of the court. He does not act as an agent for
the state, and thus his responsibility to the state is limited to obeying "its laws and the
rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part of its licensing procedures.
The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the
court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment
rights." 385 U.S. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring).
18. 385 U.S. at 520-21.
19. See 385 U.S. at 525.
20. 385 U.S. at 522-23.
21. 385 U.S. at 523-25.
22, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1952).
23. 385 U.S. at 525-26.
24. 385 U.S. at 530-32.
25. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
26. Garrity interpreted the privilege broadly. The Court held that self-incriminating
disclosures made by police officers in the course of a state investigation of traffic ticket
fixing under threat of being removed from office if they refused to testify were involuntary and therefore inadmissible in a later criminal proceeding. The choice imposed
on the officers between self-incrimination and job forfeiture was held to be compulsion
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 385 U.S. at 496-97.

88

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 72:84

one of major importance in Gardner v. Broderick.27 In that case,
Justice Fortas, ·writing for the majority, appeared to qualify the principle announced by Spevack and Garrity. Although the Court reversed the dismissal of a New York policeman who had refused to
waive immunity from criminal prosecution for his testimony before
the grand jury, as would seem to be required by Garrity, in dictum it
suggested that the reasoning in Spevack would not be extended to
cover public employees. Justice Fortas suggested that if the policeman "had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being
required to waive his immunity" he could have been dismissed.28
Although Justice Fortas carefully distinguished the case of the attorney, Justice Harlan, concurring in the result,20 felt that Gardner
provided a formula that would permit the disbarment of attorneys
for refusing to answer specific questions relating to their professional
fitness.
Spevack itself, although now clearly limited to attorneys, leaves
several questions regarding the use of the privilege in disbarment
proceedings unresolved. The first deals with the cases in which an
attorney may properly claim the privilege: May he claim it when the
disclosures sought can be sanctioned only by disbarment, rather than
by traditional criminal penalties? Second, if immunity30 is substituted for the privilege and disclosure compelled, does the immunity
prohibit disbarment based on the compelled disclosures? Finally,
may an attorney be disbarred solely on the basis of inferences of
wrongdoing or lack of candor when he has exercised the privilege
during disciplinary proceedings?

I.

MAY THE PRIVILEGE BE CLAIMED WHEN THE CONCEALED
INFORMATION COULD LEAD ONLY TO DISBARMENT?

Spevack dealt only with whether an attorney could be disbarred
for properly invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in a disbarment proceeding. The Court did not reach the question of
whether the privilege is properly invoked when the disclosures in
question can lead only to disbarment.81 Despite the language of the
fifth amendment-"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any crimi27. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). Accord, Uniform Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v. Commission
of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968) (companion case).
28. 392 U.S. at 278.
29. Uniform Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v. Commission of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280,
285 (1968) (concurring in the result in both cases).
30. Wigmore defines statutory immunity as amnesty provided by a legislative pro•
vision "for an individual offender ••• who shall disclose the facts of the offeme upon
inquiry [that] is effective to remove the criminality of the offense," 8 J, W1c1110JtE,
EVIDENCE § 2281, at 491 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis original),
31. 385 U.S. at 522 n.l (Harlan, J., dissenting),
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nal case to be a witness against himsel£"32-the courts have traditionally allowed the assertion of the privilege in civil,88 administrative,34
and legislative,35 as well as criminal, proceedings. However, although
the proceeding in which the privilege is asserted need not be criminal,
the information for which the privilege is claimed must have the
potential of exposing the speak.er to a criminal or quasi-criminal
charge.86
Thus, the question becomes whether disbarment in itself may
be characterized as a quasi-criminal sanction for purposes of the privilege, The courts have used two approaches to determine which sanctions are criminal and which are civil. The first is to look to prior
legislative history and judicial applications of the sanction in order
to determine the appropriate category for all constitutional purposes.
For example, in Trop v. Dulles, 31 the Court relied solely on a test of
legislative intent: "If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes
of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered
nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish
some other legitimate govemmental purpose,"88 The Court held that
a statute that took away the citizenship of a convicted native-born
American who deserted from the military was penal and thus st1-bject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez/' 9 the Court focused on prior
judicial characterizations as well as on legislative history. Both
sources indicated that the statute in question-which revoked the
citizenship of individuals who remained outside the United States
during wartime in order to avoid military service-was intended to
be a penalty.40 The Court held the statute unconstitutional because
it imposed such a penalty without a ~minal trial and its accompany32. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V,
33. E.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). See generally Comment, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. ?5; Note, Use
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. J,. REv. 322 (1966),
34. E.g., ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1894). See generally Sewell, The SelfIncrimination Clause and Administrative Law, 39 TENN. L. REv. 207 (19?2).
35. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 1$0 (1955); Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955).
36. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), The Court held that the privilege

against self-incrimination '' 'operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate him~elf-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal
charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to
apply.' " 350 U,S. at 431, quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1905) (emphasis
added).
37. 356 U.S. 86 (1958),
38, 356 U.S. at 96.
39. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
40. 372 U.S. at 167.
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-ing procedural safeguards.41 If this approach is applied, disbarment
would be characterized as remedial or noncriminal. Traditionally,
disbarment has in fact been viewed as either civil or sui generis.
Despite the harsh consequences on the disbarred attorney, the courts
have defined the purposes of disciplinary proceedings not as punishment, but as protection of the public and promotion of the efficient
administration of the court system.42
The Supreme Court, however, has often used a second approach,
in which the label or characterization placed on proceedings by the
legislature or the judiciary in other contexts is not conclusive. Instead, the court may weigh the " 'precise nature of the government
function involved as well as ... the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.' " 43 This method of analysis is
characteristic of the Court's handling of questions of procedural due
process generally and has led to the rejection, for example, of the
labels of "right" and "privilege."
This was the approach taken by the Court in In re Gault.44 In
determining whether certain due process safeguards are required
in the juvenile delinquency setting, the Gault Court expressly disregarded the "'civil' label-of-convenience"45 and considered instead
the individual and governmental interests involved.40 The Court
found that, despite the rehabilitative intentions of the founders of
the juvenile court system,47 the interests of a juvenile are much the
same as those of an adult criminal defendant.48 In terms of effect on
the individual, little distinction was found between incarceration in
a training school and incarceration in a prison,49 or between the
41. 372 U.S. at 167.
42. E.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882); In re Echeles, 430 F,2d 347, 849
(7th Cir. 1970); Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 57 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966);
In re Kahn, 38 App. Div. 2d 115, 124, 328 N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 (1972),
43. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoting Cafeteria &: Restaurant
Workers Union v. McEiroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961),
44. 387 U.S. I (1967).
45. 387 U.S. at 50.
46. 387 U.S. at 50•52.
47. 387 U.S. at 15-17.
48. 387 U.S. at 50-51. "The absence of substantive standards has not neccssarlly
meant that ~ildren receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The
absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always pro•
duced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles
of due process have· frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." 387 U.S. at 18-19.
49. There is still an institution of whitewashed walls and regimented routine, with
guards and law-breakers for companions. 387 U.S. at 27. In fact, the penalty for a
juvenile may be more serious than that for an adult for the same offense. Although the
juvenile in Gault was committed for a maximum of six years, the maximum punish•
ment for an adult charged with the same offense (lewd phone calls) was a fine of from
five to fifty dollars, or imprisonment for not more than two months. 387 U.S. at 29.
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stigma attached to the determination of delinquency and that attached to the determination of- criminal guilt.1'° In addition, the
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction and allow trial by the normal
criminal processes,51 or may allow the juvenile to be imprisoned
with adult criminal offenders.52
•
The Court treated each question of the proper procedure in
juvenile proceedings independently and held that notice to the juvenile and to his parents or guardian,53 opportunity for confrontation
and cross-examination, 54 and the assistance of counsel55 were necessary. In a later case, the Court also held that a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 56
Gault also held that juvenile proceedings are "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly in
light of the possible incarceration that could result from the proceedings:
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment
all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to
"criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to
determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state
institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination. To hold othenvise would be to
disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil"
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.57
The balancing approach is flexible. Therefore, a proceeding may
be found to be sufficiently "criminal" or "penal" to require certain
procedural safeguards, but not "criminal" for other due process purposes. In fact, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 58 the Court, again using
the balancing approach, held that trial by jury was not required in
juvenile proceedings. The plurality opinion focused on the special
purposes of the juvenile court system and concluded that the purpose and operation of an adjudication of juvenile delinquency are
50. 387 U.S. at 23-24.
51. 387 U.S. at 50-51.
52. 387 U.S. at 50.
53. 387 U.S. at 31-34.
54. 387 U.S. at 56-57.
55. 387 U.S. at 34-42.
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court reiterated the position taken in
Gault that " 'civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for
criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for [a] proceeding in which the
issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of
his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.'" 397 U.S. at
365-66, quoting 387 U.S. at 36.
57. 387 U.S. at 49-50.
58. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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not identical to those associated with a determination of criminal
guilt.''9 Jury trial of right would entail uthe traditional delay, the
formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the
public trial," 6() while juvenile proceedings are rather to provide an
"aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention.''61
ln In re Ruffalo,62 the Court treated the characterization of disbarment proceedings quite summarily. It stated that "disbarment,
designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed
on the lawyer."63 As a result, it found that disciplinary proceedings
are "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature" so that adequate notice of the charges that might be presented must be given
before the proceedings begin64 and the charges cannot be amended
later on the basis of the attorney's testimony. The Court did not
define the term "quasi-criminal," nor did it specify other requirements that may be imposed as a result of this characterization. In
referring to the proceedings as "quasi-criminal," however, the Court
did cite-by the use of "Cf."-the case of In re Gault.or. This may
indicate that the Court feels that the approach adopted in the juvenile cases is also appropriate to disbarment. However, many state
courts have interpreted Ruffalo narrowly and continued to analyze
disbarment as civil or sui generis for purposes other than notice. 66
The New York court of appeals, for example, commented that Ruffalo "hardly stands for an equation of criminal and disciplinary proceedings, a most unlikely view."67
Even if the balancing approach is applied, as may have been suggested by Ruffalo, to determine whether disbarment is a criminal
sanction for the purposes of the fifth amendment privilege, it is not
clear that the courts will answer the question in the affirmative.
In the process of balancing the governmental and individual
interests involved, the courts should consider the purposes68 and
history of the privilege. Historical development has been particuhirly
important in defining the scope of the privilege against self-incrimi59. 403 U.S. at 550.
60. 403 U.S. at 550.
61. 403 U.S. at 550.
62. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
63. 390 U.S. at 550.
64. 390 U.S. at 551.
65, 390 U.S. at 551, dting 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
66. See Black v. State Bar, 'l Cal. 3d 676, 687, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288,
294 (1972) and cases cited therein.
67. In Te Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 384, 244 N.E.2d 456, 466, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 951 (1968).
68. The Court has defined the limits of the privilege as being "as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,
562 (1892),
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nation: "The privilege ... is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' " 69 It
initially developed as a resistance to the oath ex officio of the ecclesiastical courts of England.70 The oath was made in ignorance of the
charges or evidence against the speak.er and consisted of a sworn
statement that he would give truthful answers to any questions that
might be asked. 71 The questions that followed were designed to
compel a confession.72
Initial opposition to the oath took the form of criticism of the
lack of a proper presentment or accusation.73 Broader objections, including the claim that the oath subjected an individual to the cruel
trilemma of contempt, perjury, or conviction, were raised later.74
In 1641, when the court of High Commission was abolished, the
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere-no man is bound to produce
against himself-was recognized. 75 This common law privilege was
eventually embodied in the fifth amendment.76
·
Despite the fact that the privilege is acknowledged to be " 'one
of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized' " 77
and a "hallmark of our democracy," 78 today there is no general agreement about either its basic purpose or its extent.79 Wigmore identified as many as twelve suggested purposes80 and stated that this
diversity results from the fact that the privilege is "many things in
as many settings" 81-it is not only the prerogative of the defendant
not to take the stand in a criminal trial82 but also the option of any
witness to refuse to disclose incriminating evidence in a criminal
69. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956), quoting New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
70. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIF111 .AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINsr SELF-INCRIM•
!NATION 60-82 (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2250.
71. L. LEVY, supra note 70, at 46-47.
72. Id. at 47, 50.
73. Ellis, Vox Populi -u. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of
the Fifth Amendment, 55 IowA L. R.Ev. 829, 834 (1970).
74. See id. at 834-35; L. LEVY, supra note '70, at 103.
75. L. LEVY, supra note 70, at 96.
76. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at 2-7.
77. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956), quoting E. GRISWOLD, supra
note 2, at 7.
78. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 582 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting),
revd., 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
79. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964), quoting Kalven,
Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 Buu..
ATOMIC SCI. 181, 182 (1953).
80. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2251.
81. Id. § 2251, at 296.
82. The defendant may choose not to take the stand, and if he does so choose, the
prosecution may not oomment upon his failure to testify in his own behalf. Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

94

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:84

or civil case or in a proceeding before an administrative board or
legislative committee. 83
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are a number of
policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
"a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him
and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load," ... our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," ... our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to
the innocent."84

In fact, the Court has acknowledged that the privilege serves so many
fundamental values that it constitutes a "reflection of our common
conscience. " 85
Out of this complex, the Court has singled out several related
values that appear to be central. It has emphasized that the privilege
is founded on a fear that statements made under compulsion will
be unreliable86 and on a fear that oppressive or cruel prosecutorial
methods might be used to compel self-incriminatory statements. 87
Most fundamentally, however, the privilege is intended to preserve the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are
not to be convicted unless the prosecution "shoulders the entire
load" 88 and to preserve the "individual's substantive right . . . 'to
a private enclave where he may lead a private life ... .' " 89 The Court
has gathered the various policies into "one overriding thought": "the
83. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 47 (1967); Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 9-i
(1964) (White, J., concurring).
84. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
85. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964), quoting E. Gruswow, supra note 2,
at 73.
86. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44-48 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-55 (1966); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896). Cf. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at 7-8. But see McKay, Self•
Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 193, 206-14. See generally 8 J.
WrnMoRE, supra note 30, § 2251, at 315-16.
88. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966), quoting United States v. Grune•
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), revd., 353 U.S. 391
(1957). See McKay, supra note 87, at 210.
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respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens." 90
·
A court using th~ balancing approach determines which governmental and individual interests should-in light of the policies underlying the privilege-be given weight. The state's interest in compelling disclosure stems from its need to protect the judicial system
and the public from those unqualified to practice as attorneys. The
attorney's dual role as officer of the court91 and fiduciary of his client92
requires that he be trustworthy and conform to a higher ethical standard than that required of other citizens.93 Disbarment may thus be
regarded, not as punishment, but as an inevitable consequence of the
loss of an attribute necessary to fulfill the attorney's responsibilities.
In addition, it has been suggested that the position of an attorney
as an officer of the court carries with it a special duty of frankness and
candor in relations with the court.94 This duty is thought to require
full and honest cooperation with any inquiry into the fitness of members of the bar, even where it calls into question the attorney's own
fitness. 96 Thus, an invocation of the privilege that hinders a court's
investigation has been viewed by some courts as inconsistent with an
attorney's role. 90 It is feared that judicial abandonment of the principle of scrupulous honesty and candor will gradually lead to the
lowering of the high ethical standards required of attorneys. 97 It has
also been suggested that the well-known requirement that attorneys
disclose all information relative to their fitness has discouraged those
who might otherwise have sought to become attorneys in order to
exploit the judicial system or individual clients98 and that any rejec90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
91. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 267, 288 (1883); Ex parte Griffith, 278 Ala. 344, 348, 178 S.2d 169, 174 (1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 988 (1966); White v. Sadler, 350 Mich. 511, 525-26, 87 N.W.2d
192, 200 (1958); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966).
92. See, e.g., Cole supra note 1, at 820-21.
93. Cathey, supra note 1, at 362. See generally AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY (1970).
94. In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 841, 415 P.2d 800, 802, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914
(1966); H. DRINKER, LEGAL Ennes 74-76 (1953).
95. In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 35, 128 S.W.2d 657, 664-65 (1939); In re Cohen,
7 N.Y.2d 488, 495-97, 166 N.E.2d 672, 675-77, afjd. sub. nom. Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961).
96. Such a failure of responsibility constituted the sole ground of Spevack.'s disbarment in the decisions of the referee and of the New York trial court. In re Spevack.,
24 App. Div. 2d 653 (1965).
97. Justice Harlan warned of the danger of encouraging "oncoming generations of
lawyers to think of their calling as imposing on them no higher standards of behavior
than might be acceptable in the general marketplace." Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 5ll,
521 (1967) (dissenting opinion). See also Undenvood, supra note 1, at 136.
98. Underwood, supra note 1, at 135.
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tion of the requirement of disclosure might encourage these individuals to seek admission to the bar.99
Moreover, the attorney's exercise of the privilege against selfincrimination may place a substantial additional burden on the enforcement of bar discipline, which at present depends heavily on the
attorney's voluntary cooperation. Despite the great public interest in
bar discipline, present procedures have proved to be ineffective in
identifying and sanctioning attorneys who misuse their position. For
example, a 1966 New York study found that only 2 per cent of the
attorneys who violated generally acceptable ethical norms were processed by the disciplinary machinery and that less than .2 per cent
were officially sanctioned.100 A 1970 American Bar Association committee report on disciplinary enforcement indicated the existence
of "a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of
the entire profession."101 As a result, pressure is building, both inside
the bar102 and from the general public,103 to rid the profession of attorneys who abuse their prerogatives and neglect their responsibilities. It has repeatedly been suggested that, if reform does not come
quickly from within, it ·will be imposed from without.104
At present, disciplinary committees must rely primarily on complaints from laymen to initiate actions106 and often lack the professional staff and finances required for extensive investigations.100 Thus,
one of the few resources now available to the disciplinary machinery
is the attorney's own testimony and records. Moreover, much of the
information relative to the attorney's conduct will be within his own
control. 107 In such circumstances the attorney's refusal to provide evidence or to testify on the ground that the information disclosed may
lead to his disbarment could make effective bar discipline impossible.
Moreover, the bar committees and the courts are often too solicitous of the individual attorney's interest. The record seems to indicate, not unjustified prosecutions, but a failure to enforce discipline
99. Id.
100. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 170 (1966).
101. CLARK Comrrrnm REPORT, supra note 4, at I. "[T)he present enforcement
structure is failing to rid the profession of a substantial number of malefactors." Id,
at 2-3.
102. See, e.g., id. at 1-8; Frand<, New Life for Lawyer Self-Discipline: The Disciplinary Report of the Clark Committee, 54 JUDICATURE 383 (1971); Wright, SelfDiscipline of the Bar: Theory or Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971); Note, Achieving Effective
Bar Discipline, 6 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 974 (1972); Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism,
79 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179-80 (1970).
103. Burger, A Sick Profession?, 5 TULSA L.J. 1, 1-2 (1968).
104. See, e.g., CLARK ComrrrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9.
105. Id. at 60-66. See id. •at 52-53.
106. Id. at 19-23.
107. Niles & Kaye, supra note 1, at 1123.
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stringently enough.108 In this context, procedural safeguards seem
less crucial than in the area of criminal law enforcement.
Further, it might be argued that allowing an attorney to invoke
the privilege when the compelled disclosures could lead to disbarment would eventually justify the invocation of the privilege when
disclosures could lead to denial of admission to the bar.109 This conclusion results naturally from the Court's tendency to treat disbarment and admissions cases as indistinguishable for purposes of imposing requirements of procedural due process.11° Since present bar
resources are inadequate to fund independent investigations of even
the relatively small number of disciplinary proceedings that arise,111
extensive inquiry into the qualifications of the many applicants to
the bar would be impossible. This would expose the court "to the
possible indignity that it may one day have to admit to its own bar
... a lawyer [suspected of misconduct who has thwarted "official inquiry] unless it can somehow get at t}J.e truth of suspicions, the investigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in blocking. "112
In contrast to the state's urgent need for information relating to
an attorney's fitness, the individual attorney has a strong interest in
nondisclosure. Despite the fact that the courts do not intend disbarment to operate as a punishment, it has severe effects upon the individual attorney, whose practice is his means of livelihood. As the
Second Circuit commented when considering a petition for injunctive
relief against state disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the
proceedings violated an attorney's civil rights: "A lawyer is not
usually motivated solely by the prospect of monetary gain in seeking
admission to the bar or in practicing his chosen profession. However,
it cannot be disputed that for most attorneys the license to practice
law represents their livelihood, the loss of which may be greater
punishment than a monetary fine. " 113
In addition, the attorney's practice represents a substantial investment of time, money, and energy. Justice Black noted:
108. CLARK COMMIITEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-26, 167-71.
109. Indeed, this argument has been made. See Underwood, supra note I, at 134-35.
110. In Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 213 (1961), the Court stated, "The fact that
such refusal [to answer bar committee questions under claim of a constitutional
privilege] was here made a ground for disbarment, rather than for denial of admission
to the bar, as in Konigsberg and Anastaplo, is not of constitutional moment." In
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957), the Court stated the
rationale of the case in terms equally applicable to admissions or disbarment proceedings: "A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
111. See, e.g., text accompanying note 100 supra.
112. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 521 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The la,;vyer's abilities, acquired through long and expensive education, and the goodwill attached to his practice, acquired in part
through uncompensated services, are capital assets that belong to the
Ia,vyer ....
These assets should be no more subject to confiscation than his
home or any other asset he may have acquired through his industry
and initiative.114

Not only does the sanction of disbarment permanently prevent the
attorney from utilizing this investment and earning his livelihood,
but it also deprives him of his professional and personal reputation.m
As in Gault,11 6 disbarment, even if not intended to be punitive,
creates a stigma that is scarcely distinguishable from that resulting
from a criminal conviction.
It should be emphasized that the interests involved in disbarment
can be distinguished from those involved in admissions proceedings.
Although denial of admission also has a harsh effect on one who has
spent three years and a large sum to complete his legal education,117
this loss is less severe than that suffered by an established member of
the bar, who has a greater investment of time and money and incurs
the greater dishonor of having to leave professional life abruptly.
Moreover, despite the tendency to equate the two proceedings,118
the courts have traditionally drawn a distinction between disbarment
and admissions in the placement of burden of proof. The applicant
for admission to the bar generally has the burden of proving his fitness to serve as an attorney.119 However, once he has satisfactorily
established his educational qualifications and good character and has
been admitted, the state bears the burden of proving misconduct or
lack of the required good character in order to disbar him. 120 Although the maintenance of good character is an attorney's continuing
obligation, it would be unreasonable to require him repeatedly to
produce evidence of his fitness. Thus, even though disbarment pro114. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 146 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
115. 366 U.S. at 147 (Black, J., dissenting).
116. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
117. "While ·this [the bar admissions proceeding] is not a criminal case, its conse•
quences-for Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil cases. The Committee's
action prevents him from earning a living by practicing law. This deprivation has
grave consequences for a man who has spent years of study and a great deal of money
in preparing to be a lawyer." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1957),
118. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
119. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 85-90 (1961): Konigsberg v. State Dar,
366 U.S. 36, 40-42 (1961) and cases cited therein; Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 91,
397 P .2d 205, 207 (1964): H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 46. The inquiry is more limited
in the area of beliefs and associations, which are protected by the first amendment.
See, e.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
CJ. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971),
120. In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361, 363, cert, denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950); Roark v. State
Bar, 5 Cal. 2d 665, 668, 55 P.2d 839, 841 (193'6); H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 43,
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ceedings, like admissions proceedings, raise the question of the attorney's qualifications, his good character as established at the time of
his a~mission is presumed. As in a criminal proceeding, the privilege
to remain silent is consistent with the state's obligation to prove misconduct, for the purpose of the privilege is to force the state, in an
adversary system, to bear its rightful burden of proof when it seeks
to impose a harsh sanction.121 In admissions proceedings, on the
other hand, the privilege of remaining silent is difficult to reconcile
with the individual's obligation to prove his fitness. If the scope of
the privilege is extended this far, an individual could, by a claim of
privilege, shift the burden to the state to justify not finding him
qualified.
The interest of the individual attorney in the protection provided
by the privilege against self-incrimination is particularly important
in view of the fact that the bar's attempt to ensure high ethical standards through self-regulation has produced a uniquely inbred system.
Other professions also conduct preliminary investigations and disciplinary hearings,122 which are subject to judicial review.123 However,
only bar disciplinary proceedings are conducted entirely by members
of the party's own profession from investigation through final judicial
review. While this situation may actually produce laxness in disciplining personal friends and associates,124 it also allows participation by
individuals who have a personal interest in and knowledge of the profession and may be biased against the individual under investigation,
either by personal animosity or by their competitive relationship. 125
Procedural safeguards are thus particularly necessary to ensure fairness in attorney disciplinary proceedings. Certainly the majority of
disciplinary proceedings are neither ill-founded nor unfairly han121. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
122. For example, in Ohio the state boards of accountancy, OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4701.02 (Page Supp. 1972): architecture, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4703.01 (Page 1954):
dentistry, OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4715.02 (Page 1954); and pharmacy, OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4729.01 (Page Supp. 1972), are composed of members of these respective pro•
fessions. The boards have the authority to suspend or revoke licenses to practice: OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 4701.16 (Page Supp. 1972) (accountants); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4703.15 (Page Supp. 1972) (architects); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4715.30, .36 (Page
1954), as amended, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4715.36 (Page Supp. 1972) (dentists); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.16-.17 (Page 1954), as amended, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.16.17 (Page Supp. 1972) (pharmacists).
123. See, e.g., Doelker v. Accountancy Bd., 12 Ohio St. 2d 76, 232 N.E.2d 407 (1967).
In many situations review is constitutionally required. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 381-89 (1965).
124. CLARK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-26, 167-71.
125. In Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 148 n.37 (1961), Justice Black noted in his
dissent that "[t]he true nature of the underlying controversy in this case, as a controversy between economically competing groups of.lawyers is shown by the fact that four
different associations of attorneys filed briefs as amici curiae in the present proceedings-two favorable to petitioner and two favorable to respondent."
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dled. 126 Nevertheless, history indicates that these proceedings may
be misused.127 Moreover, it is foreign to our constitutional system to
force any individual to rely on the good faith of others to ensure his
basic freedoms.
It should also be mentioned that classifying disbarment as quasicriminal has a practical advantage in that the determination of
whether criminal prosecution is a substantial possibility need not be
made,128 for the likelihood that the compelled disclosure would lead
to disbarment would be sufficient.
Once the competing interests are established, the court must balance those of the individual against the state. In doing this, the court
should give careful consideration to the attorney's special responsibilities. Despite its recognition that the state's concern is vital, the
majority in Spevack expressly rejected the contention that an attorney
is under any special disability as regards his protected right to silence.
As the plurality in Spevack stated, "Like the schoolteacher . • • and
the policemen ... lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship."129 However, this does not necessarily mean that the Court will go so far as
to find that disbarment is a quasi-criminal sanction for purposes of
the fifth amendment privilege. Such an interpretation, if our reasoning to this point is correct, would prohibit disbarment on the basis
of information disclosed under compulsion even though the information in question could not lead to a traditional criminal sanction.
In contrast, the Court suggested in Gardner that public employees
in an analogous situation could be dismissed.130
Furthermore, the Court's attitude toward the attorney's role may
have been modified with the changes on the Court since Spevack.131
Its new members may return to the position advocated by Justice
Harlan, who placed primary emphasis on the protection of the high
126. Cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159
(1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 36 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 140-41, 144-45 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Assodations and Courts, 5 HARV, Civ. RIGHTS•
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 301, 301-03, 308-14 (1970).
128. The privilege against self-incrimination applies to answers that would furnish
a link in a chain needed to prosecute the claimant as well as to answers that arc

sufficient in themselves to support a conviction. The court must determine for itself
whether the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). "To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
129. 385 U.S. at 516.
130. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
131. Two members of the plurality (Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black), two
members of the dissent Gustices Harlan and Clark), and Justice Fortas, whose concurrence distinguished attorneys from other state employees, have left the Court since
Spevack.
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standards of the bar.132 Or the new members might accept the view
suggested by Justice Black in his dissent in Cohen. This view recognizes that the state needs information pertaining to the fitness of
attorneys but gives more weight to the notion that it is particularly
important that attorneys, precisely because of their important public
role, retain all their constitutional rights and safeguards:
[T]he important role that lawyers are called upon to play in our
society would make it all the more imperative that they not be discriminated against with regard to the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of
governmental power. For, in my judgment, one of the great purposes
underlying the grant of those freedoms was to give independence to
those who must discharge important public responsibilities. The legal
profession, ·with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any
group in our society, must have that independence. If it is denied
them, they are likely to become nothing more than parrots of the
views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment.133
Further, an attorney's reliance on the protection of the Constitution, even if it has the effect of hindering the court's investigation
of his fitness, should not be viewed as inconsistent with his role as an
officer of the court. It seems inappropriate for a court to classify an
insistence that it respect a right granted by the Constitution as a
breach of duty to that court.134
Recent cases suggest that the Court, in evaluating the weight
of an individual's interests, has rejected the use of such labels as
"right" and "privilege"135 and will inquire instead as to whether the
individual's interest has become "vested" and thus must be balanced
against the needs of the state.136 This approach has been used by the
Court in determining that welfare benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement to those qualified to receive them137 and that constitutional safeguards are therefore applicable to benefit revocation. Likewise, the Court has distinguished between the interests of two types
of nontenured schoolteachers on this basis. In the case of an individual who alleged only that he was hired on a one-year contract, procedural due process was inapplicable where the state failed to rehire
him. 138 But in the case of a teacher who alleged in addition an in132. See 385 U.S. at 521.
133. 366 U.S. at 138.
134. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 133 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
135. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
136. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 (1970); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957).
137. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
138. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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formal tenure system, which justified his expectations of continued
employment, the state was required to provide him with notice and
an opportunity for a hearing to contest the failure to rehire him. 189
The attorney's right to practice should also be considered to be a
matter of entitlement to an individual once he has demonstrated
that he has the legal education and good character required for admission to the bar. 140 Thus, although many courts have characterized the attorney's interest in continuing to practice as a privilege,141
this interest should be protected by constitutional safeguards. 142
Assuming that the attorney's interest is "vested" in this way,
there are strong arguments in favor of classifying disbarment as a
quasi-criminal sanction. Such a classification would forward many
of the policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination.143
This would result in an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial form
of proceeding and would preserve an individual-state balance in
which the state is required to "shoulder the entire load" when seeking to impose a severe sanction. It would protect the privacy of the
individual from groundless intrusion by the state. It would force the
state to refrain from putting the individual to the kind of impossible
choice posed by the traditional "cruel trilemma." 144 To the extent
that the privilege shields the innocent and filters out inherently unreliable statements made under compulsion, it would serve this function in disciplinary proceedings, where the distorting pressure of
compulsion may be as strong as it is in many criminal trials.
Further, the history and purpose of the privilege suggest that the
public need for disclosure is not as strong here as it would be in a
139. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
140. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971). An attorney is entitled to hold his office
during good behavior. In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899); State ex rel. Foster v.
Washington State Bar Assn., 23 Wash. 2d 800, 162 P.2d 261 (1945). The right to practice
is revocable only for good cause shown at a legal proceeding. Randall v. Brigham, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). But see Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1971) (Dlackmun,
J., dissenting).
·
141. E.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). Cardozo's opinion in
In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661
(1918), is the classic statement of this theory:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private
and professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is
essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally essential afterwards •• , •
Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege is lost.••• To strike the unworthy
lawyer from the roll is not to add to the pains and penalties of crime. The examination into character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer satisfied. For
these reasons courts have repeatedly said that disbarment is not punishment.
The privilege theory was also applied to physicians in Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442 (1954), where a physician's license was suspended for failure to turn over
records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee to the House Un-American Activ,
ities Committee.
142. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
143. For a discussion of these policies, see text accompanying notes 77-90 supra.
144. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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criminal proceeding. In the criminal trial, although there isi a compelling necessity for disclosure both because of the seriousness of
criminal conduct and because of the high standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the privilege is fully extended under the fifth
amendment. In disbarment proceedings, where the st,ate :hears a
lower burden of proof,145 the public need for compelled testimony
appears to be no greater. The privilege guarantees that the individual's interest will be protected even at the expense of lowered state
efficiency. As in the case of criminal law enforcement,, the state's
vital interest in attorney discipline suggests a need for a reallocation
of resources to permit efficient discipline, rather than a narrowing of
constitutional rights, for, although disbarment is intended to be remedial, rather than punitive, some courts have found that it is a more
severe sanction than a short period of imprisonment.146 At least one
member of the present Court has recognized that some noncriminal
sanctions have such a serious effect on an individual that due process
requires that certain procedural safeguards generally associated with
criminal trials be observed before the sanction is applied. In a concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin,147 Justice Powell pointed
out that, to an individual whose job requires driving, deprivation of
a driver's license is a more serious consequence than a brief stay in
jail.148 He argued that court-appointed counsel is required by due
process, not only when imprisonment may be imposed, but in all
cases where the "deprivation of property rights and interests is. of
sufficient consequence" and the indigent is capable of defending himself.149 The sanction of permanent disbarment is even more serious
than deprivation of one's driver's license, because it forecloses all job
opportunities in the attorney's field of training, at least in his ·home
state.150
There is clear precedent for the clc1.ssification of serious nonimprisonment sanctions as criminal or penal for the purposes of various
con~titutional safeguards. In certain situations loss of citizenship,151
disqualification from the clergy, 152 permanent exclusion from, public
employment,153 and even exclusion from the federal bar154 have all
been held to be penal for constitu~onal purposes.
··
145. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
146. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
147. 407 U.S. 25, 44-66 (1972).
148. 407 U.S. at 48.
149. 407 U.S. at 48.
150. Disbarment by a state court does not automatically result in disbarment from
federal court or from other state courts. See note 3 supra.
151. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
152. Cummings v. Missouri, '71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
153. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
154. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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Additionally, the juvenile analogy from Gault provides a precedent for extending the term "quasi-criminal" to cover disbarment.ir;r;
Although the Gault reasoning suggests that disbarment, like juvenile
delinquency proceedings, may be quasi-criminal for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the California supreme court
recently seems to have rejected this analogy in Black v. State Bar.m
That court held that an attorney in a disbarment case does not
have the right of a criminal defendant to refuse to testify at all.
Gault was distinguished on the grounds that disbarment proceedings, unlike juvenile delinquency proceedings, cannot result in
incarceration and that those sanctions that are imposed are designed
only to protect the courts and the public, not to punish.m
This method of distinguishing Gault, although justified to some
extent by that case's emphasis on loss of liberty in its discussion of
the privilege against self-incrimination,1G8 ignores the wider scope of
the Court's analysis. The Gault opinion, taken as a whole, describes
a series of factors-in addition to involuntary confinement-that are
common to criminal and juvenile proceedings; these include the
attendant social stigma159 and the availability of the juvenile's record
to law enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, social service agencies, and private employers.160
Other cases dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination
indicate that incarceration is not a prerequisite for the operation of
the privilege. As early as 1886 the Supreme Court held, in Boyd v.
United States,161 that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibited compulsory production of goods and papers in a nominally
civil forfeiture proceeding based on an alleged violation of the customs laws. The Court held that the owner of the goods could not be
forced to incriminate himself simply because the prosecutor decided
to forgo a criminal prosecution and sue in rem for the goods.162 It
noted that the forfeiture and the traditionally criminal sanctions were
penalties for the same criminal act. 168 The Court concluded that "[a]s,
therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all
the purposes ... of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which de155. See text accompanying notes 44-57 supra.
156. 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972).
157. 7 Cal. 3d at 688, 499 P.2d at 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
158• .387 U.S. at 49-50.
159. 387 U.S. at 24.
160. 387 U.S. at 24-25.
161. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
162. 116 U.S. at 634.
163. 116 U.S. at 634.
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dares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ...."164
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Boyd in United States v.
United States Coin & Currency165 and announced: "From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man
who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct. In both instances, money liability
is predicated upon a finding of the owner's wrongful conduct; in both
cases, the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force." 166 The forfeiture proceedings were characterized as criminal although, theoretically, the individuals who had fraudulently failed to pay the
customs fees or used the money in gambling were not even parties to
the actions, which had been brought against the goods themselves.
However, juvenile and forfeiture proceedings differ from disbarment in an important respect. The main distinction between Gault,
Boyd, and United States Coin & Currency, on the one hand, and disbarment proceedings, on the other, is that the civil remedy sought
by the state in the former cases was, in effect, an alternative to a criminal sanction. In Boyd, the customs act167 provided for a forfeiture,
proceeding in addition to either fine or imprisonment;168 the prosecutor waived the indictment and instituted a court action for the
goods.169 In United States Coin & Currency, the statute provided that
no property rights existed in property "intended for use in violating
the provisions of the internal revenue laws."170 The forfeiture of the
money to be used in gambling was thus the practical equivalent of a
fine for the gambling itself.171 In Gault the court noted that a state
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction and allow the child to be tried
as an adult.172 The effect of these cases is to refuse to allow the state,
by electing a nominally civil proceeding, to impose a punishment for
a criminal act while denying the accused the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court may seize upon this distinction between disbarment
proceedings, on the one hand, and juvenile and forfeiture proceedings, on the other, and refuse to extend the scope of the privilege to
cover disbarment, for cases dealing with the privilege against selfU.S. at 634-35.
U.S. 715 (1971).
U.S. at 718.
~
of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186.
of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 12, 18 Stat. 186.
U.S. at 634.
INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7302.
See text accompanying note 166 supra,
l72. 3S7
gt 50-5J.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

116
401
401
Act
Act
116

v.s.
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incrimination indicate that, despite the fundamental status of the
privilege, the Court has been willing to weigh state interests heavily.173 In fact, in several cases the Court has expressly noted that the
privilege against self-incrimination "has never been given the full
scope which the values it helps to protect suggest."174
Moreover, in questions involving bar proceedings the Supreme
Court has deferred to the states in the interest of federalism. The concept of local control of the bar was firmly established in England17G
and has received continued support in the United States.17° In the
area of bar admissions,177 for example, the Court has been persuaded
by the states' concern for the integrity of their legal process and has
on this basis upheld questionable admissions procedures against first
amendment challenges.178 Since each state's interest in the integrity
of its own judicial system demands effective regulation of the bar, a
federally imposed interpretation of the privilege that constrains the
states' disciplinary machinery may constitute unwarranted interference with matters of legitimate local concern.
Despite the strength of an individual attorney's interest and the
similarity of this interest to other interests previously held quasicriminal, on balance it seems fair to say that the Court will be very
reluctant to find disbarment to be quasi-criminal if doing so necessarily precludes effective bar discipline. However, the vital importance of the individual interests in this area suggest that the conflict
would be better resolved if a method could be devised whereby effective bar discipline could be achieved without the sacrifice of the
individual's interests.
A partial resolution might be reached if more resources could
be committed to bar discipline, for the bar could then make a more
extensive independent investigation and utilize methods that do not
require the cooperation and testimony of the accused. For example,
173. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972): California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
174. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966), quoted in Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Similar language can be found in
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
175. See 2
HOLDSWORTH, A HisrORY OF ENGLISH LAW 311-19, 493-506 (4th ed.
1936). See generally H. COHEN, A HisroRY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND ATIORNATUS TO
1450 (1929).
176. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). See also C. WARREN, A
HlsroRY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 39-143 (1911),
177. Justice Harlan noted that bar admissions practices are "an area of federal-state
relations ••• into which [federal courts] should be especially reluctant and slow to
enter." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 276 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
178. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971);
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). See
Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Admission to the
Bar, 71 Mica. L. REv. 838, 841-42 (1973). But see Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. I (1971);
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).

w.
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in many cases the attorney represents his client in dealings with third
parties, such as the court or the opposing parties in a case. In these
situations the other parties could be contacted to verify or supplement
the allegations made by the client-complainant. Such evidence, if unrebutted by the attorney who claims the right to silence, would often
carry the state's burden, which is generally described as that of presenting clear and convincing proof, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.179
But there would still be many instances in which even an adequately trained, staffed, and :financed disciplinary agency cannot
prove misconduct without the records of the attorney. As suggested
by Justice Fortas in his concurrence in Spevack, in these situations
a legal framework for compelling the attorney to produce the necessary records could be provided by the "required records" doctrine.
This doctrine was developed in Shapiro v. United States,180 where
the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not extend to " 'records required by law to be kept in order
that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the
appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement or restrictions validly established.' " 181 The doctrine was applied in Shapiro to a wholesale produce dealer's sales records kept
in accordance with the Emergency Price Control Act.182
Recent opinions have identified three interrelated elements of
the required records doctrine: "[F]irst, the purposes of the ... inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be
obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which
the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least
analogous to public documents.''183 The Court has further limited
the necessary "public aspects" to situations in which there is more
than a governmental need to obtain information.184 The state must
also have the authority to regulate or prohibit the basic activity and,
thus, to require the keeping of specific records for inspection by an
179. In re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P.2d 441 (1970) (clear and convincing proof);
In re Simpson, 47 Ill. 2d 562, 268 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (clear and convincing proof); Iowa
State Bar Assn. v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 194, 148 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967) (convincing
preponderance of the evidence). Contra, Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga. App. 371, 170
S.E.2d 732 (1969) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
180. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
181. 335 U.S. at 33, quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1946).
182. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
183. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968). Although the cases cited in
Grosso deal specifically with required records only in the federal context, the incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege into the fourteenth amendment's requirement
of due process, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), makes the required records
doctrine equally applicable in state proceedings. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
184. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).
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appropriate government official.185 This rule could easily be applied
in the regulation of the bar. The bar has long been subject to the
states' power to regulate, 186 and the type of detailed information that
might be required to be disclosed, such as that relating to the handling of client's funds, should generally involve little more than the
record-keeping expected of a conscientious fiduciary. 187
The records to be required should be carefully defined in order
to avoid any conflict with the attorney-client privilege. 188 However,
any inroad that the adoption of this doctrine may make upon the
attorney-client privilege would be small in comparison to the inroad
presently made by the broader requirement that the attorney disclose all requested information relevant to his fitness.
A limited use of the required records doctrine could minimize the
encroachment on the attorney's right against self-incrimination while
protecting the interests of his clients and society. In some cases, it is
true, neither independent investigation nor the use of the required
records doctrine may develop evidence sufficient to carry the state's
burden of proof. It is suggested that this situation is precisely that in
which the primary purpose of the privilege-forcing the state to
shoulder the entire load and respect the privacy of the individualdictates that the individual's interest be protected by the fifth amendment.
If the required records doctrine is held applicable, so that the
state's interest is sufficiently protected, the courts may find that the
individual's interest in nondisclosure is such that the policies and
history of the privilege compel classification of disbarment as quasicriminal.

II.

DOES IMMUNITY PROHIBIT DISBARMENT BASED ON THE
COMPELLED DISCLOSURES?

A second question regarding the attorney's privilege against selfincrimination is whether the immunity that may be offered in exchange for a waiver of the privilege prohibits disbarment, as well as
criminal sanctions, based on the compelled disclosures. The Supreme
Court long ago established that statutes that grant immunity are not
incompatible with the privilege against self-incrimination,180 for they
185. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1948).
186. See notes 3.5 supra and accompanying text.
187. Manahan, Lawyers Should Be Audited, 59 A.B.A.J. 396, 398 (1973); Niles r.:
Kaye, supra note I, at 1125-26.
188. The attorney-client privilege prohibits the compelled disclosure by eitl1er

attorney or client of communications made in confidence by the client when legal
advice was sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, unless the
client waives the privilege. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PRO•
fESSIONAL R.EsPONSIBILITY, Canon 4 (1970); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, §§ 2290-329,
J89. Brgwn v. Walk~, 161 V.S, 591 (1896),
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"seek a rational accommodation bettveen the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demand of the government to compel citizens
to testify."190 Thus, the government may constitutionally compel an
individual to divulge self-incriminatory information by granting him
immunity from criminal sanctions based on the disclosure. However,
this immunity is adequate only if it is as broad as the protection of
the privilege that it replaces.191
The breadth of any particular immunity depends upon the intent of the legislation under which it is conferred. In practical terms,
it seems fair to assume that in most cases the legislature intends its
immunity statutes to be only as broad as is required by the Constitution.192 Thus, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires that the immunity granted protect the attorney from disbarment on the basis of compelled disclosures.
In Ullmann v. United States,193 a majority of the Supreme Court
held that the government may constitutionally impose, or permit
the imposition of serious, though noncriminal, sanctions based on
disclosures made under a grant of immunity. In Ullmann the petitioner was given immunity in order to testify before a federal grand
jury about his knowledge of and participation in espionage and about
his and others' membership in the Communist Party. He claimed
that the immunity statute involved was not broad enough because of
disabilities, "such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state
registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general public opprobrium,''194 that might still be imposed by the state
and federal authorities, as well as by the general public. The Court
reiterated its frequent holding that immunity, to be constitutionally
valid, need only remove the sanctions that generate the fear that
justifies the invocation of the privilege-that is, criminal sanctions.195
190. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
191. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
192. Cf. In re Colacasides, 6 Mich. App. 298, 148 N.W.2d 898, afjd., 379 Mich. 69,
150 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
193. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
194. 350 U.S. at 430.
195. 350 U.S. at 430-31. The dissent in Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 440-55 (Douglas & Black,
JJ., dissenting), suggests an alternative analysis, which would require that immunity,
to be constitutionally adequate to compel self-incriminatory disclosures, must leave the
individual in the same relative position vis-a-vis the state as before disclosure. This
requirement would not, of course, place any burden on the state to prohibit sanctions
(for example, loss of employment) imposed by private third parties. It would, however,
prevent the state from imposing sanctions normally used in addition to criminal sanctions-e.g., loss of the vote, passport eligibility, and/or eligibility for various licensed
professions-to punish, in effect, the individuals for the activities disclosed.
This argument suggests that the attorney should not be placed between the rock
and the whirlpool by the operation of an immunity statute. That is, if he testifies and
incriminates himself, he stands to lose his practice, which is probably his most valuable
J>OSSession, as well as his honor. If he chooses to cling to silence, he stands to be held
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Thus, in order to establish that a grant of immunity, to be constitutionally valid, must prevent the imposition of a given sanction, the
individual must prove that the particular sanction is criminal. Under the Ullmann rationale, which has been reaffirmed by the present
Court,196 disbarment on the basis of testimony given under immunity
would be impermissible only if the disbarment itself is viewed as a
criminal sanction.
The New York courts have followed this reasoning and have
repeatedly found that disbarment based on testimony compelled
under a grant of immunity is permissible.197 In reaching this conclusion, they have relied primarily on the fact that the Supreme
Court had not found disbarment proceedings to be criminal. The
New York courts then found that the privilege, which is literally
limited to criminal proceedings, does not apply to disbarment and
that, therefore, no immunity from disbarment need be granted.
in contempt, possibly imprisoned. Such a willful contempt citation may serve as a
ground for disbarment. See, e.g., In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d 1'76 (1971);
In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953}, If, under
these pressures, he lies, he will have committed perjury and again may not only be
imprisoned but also be disbarred. E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d 434
(1965); Silver v. Goldner, 15 App. Div. 2d 558, 222 N.Y.S.2d 854, affd., 14 N.\'.2d 593,
198 N.E.2d 262, 248 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 959 (1965). Thus, it can
be argued that an immunity statute that protects the individual only from criminal
sanctions subjects him to the cruel trilemma that the privilege against self-incrimination
attempts to prohibit.
However, the present Court appears unlikely to accept this argument, In addition
to citing Ullmann with approval, it rejected an analogous argument by Justice Marshall
in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 467-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), that
an individual could not be put in a worse practical position vis-a-vis the government
by the use of an immunity statute. In Kastigar Justice Marshall argued that it may be
impossible to prove that evidence used to convict resulted from the use or derivative
use of the compelled testimony, rather than from an independent source, Even if the
state bears the burden of proving that the source was untainted, it may meet this
burden with mere assertions unless the individual asserts some contrary proof. Thus,
the protection of the individual from the use of his compelled testimony is placed in
the hands of individuals whose main duty is to convict such persons. 406 U.S. at 468-69
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigating Commn., 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court held that transactional immunity, which
completely prohibits prosecution for any offenses disclosed by testimony under immunity, though permissible, was not constitutionally required. The purpose of the
privilege against self-incrimination.-to avoid compelling disclosures that could furnish
a link in the chain leading to prosecution-is satisfied if the disclosure itself and any
evidence obtained by the use of the disclosure is excluded from subsequent criminal
proceedings. In order to compel disclosure the immunity need be only as broad as the
privilege.
197. In re Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920, 237 N.E.2d 75, 289 N.Y.S.2d '755, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 840 (1968); In re Epstein, 37 App. Div. 2d 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d 65'7, appeal dis•
missed, 29 N.Y.2d 875, 328 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972);
In re Selig, 32 App. Div. 2d 213, 302 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1969); In re Ungar, 27 App. Div. 2d
925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 155, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). Similar statutes in other states
have also been held constitutional. E.g., Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D, Ill.
1970), afjd., 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972) (removal of judge);
In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 344, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 104'7 {1973),
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However, if the analysis suggested in section 1198 is adopted, and
disbarment is treated as quasi-criminal for purposes of the privilege,
the immunity exchanged for the privilege should also prohibit disbarment based on the compelled disclosures.199 This approach, however, raises the possibility that an attorney whose admitted conduct
has demonstrated that he is unfit will be permitted to continue to
practice. This prospect appears so objectionable that it alone might
justify a refusal to change the accepted classification of disbarment
as a civil sanction for purposes of both questions, so that neither the
privilege against self-incrimination nor immunity would bar the
compulsion of disclosures or the use of disclosed information in
disciplinary proceedings.200 Even in the criminal context, however,
every instance in which immunity is extended results not only in
social benefit from the use of the testimony compelled, but also in the
social cost of foregoing the punishment of the individual.201 There
is always some potential harm if the individual is allowed to go unpunished, for he may continue to engage in the conduct revealed under immunity. The problem presented by an attorney's testifying
under immunity is no different qualitatively than that presented by
the operation of immunity statutes in general, although it may differ
quantitatively: The potential for harm to third persons is multiplied
because the attorney is allowed to continue-with the apparent approval of the state-in the fiduciary position that he has misused in
the past.
This, however, does not necessarily justify rejecting the over-all
classification of disbarment as a penal sanction. Rather, it is but one
factor in determining whether to grant immunity to a given attorney.
Under the present system the social cost involved in foregoing punishment is weighed against the benefits to be gained by compelling testimony in each case; if the social cost is too high, the immunity is with198. See text accompanying notes 31-188 supra.
199. This analysis is consistent with Ullmann, which expressly provided that the
petitioner could avoid the sanctions that he alleged might be imposed by successfully
showing them to be criminal. 350 U.S. at 431.
200. In a similar situation, Judge Cardozo concluded: "[W]e will not declare, unless
driven to it by sheer necessity, that a confessed criminal has been intrenched by the
very confession of his guilt beyond the power of removal." In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81,
85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). The courts have achieved
the most fle.xibility in the area of bar discipline by carefully defining the purpose of
their proceedings as nonpunitive and thus civil or sui generis. Thus, in addition to the
fact that testimony given under immunity could be used to disbar, it has been held
that neith.er pardon nor acquittal of a criminal offense would bar discipline and that
no statute of limitations applies to a disciplinary proceeding. See In re Nilva, 266 Minn.
576, 583, 123 N.W.2d 803, 808-09 (1963); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 428-29; 433-34, 177
A.2d 721, 735, 738 (1962); In re Schildhaus, 23 App. Div. 2d 152, 259 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1965);
H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 35.-38.
201. Immunity statutes were intended to serve as a method of balancing various
social costs and benefits. Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972)
with 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2281, at 492.
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held. The fact that it is undesirable to allow an attorney who has
admitted conduct that demonstrates his lack of fitness to continue
practicing law only indicates that the social cost of granting immunity
will often be too high. 202 It does not alter the conclusion that, if
immunity is granted, disbarment should be classified as a penal or
quasi-criminal sanction so that the disclosures made under immunity
cannot be used to disbar.

III.

MAY THE ATTORNEY'S CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE BE
USED AS EVIDENCE OF HIS LACK OF FITNESS?

The final question deals, not with the extent of an attorney's
privilege against self-incrimination, but with the effect of its use in
a disciplinary proceeding. Spevack held that an attorney could not
be disbarred solely on the basis of his exercise of the privilege.203
May the state nevertheless, through comment or inference, point to
his silence as one indication of his guilt? Or may the state disbar the
attorney on the ground that his refusal to answer demonstrates that
he lacks the candor and cooperativeness required of attorneys?
A.

Comment on and Inference from the Use of the Privilege

In a criminal proceeding, a comment by the prosecutor or the
court to the effect that the defendant's exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination indicates his guilt itself violates the defendant's
privilege. In Griffin v. California,204 the Supreme Court held that
such a comment by a prosecutor was improper because it made the
assertion of the privilege "costly." The trial court may not "solemnize
the silence of the accused into evidence against him."200 The Court
distinguished this impermissible conversion of the privilege into
evidence of guilt from the permissible and natural presumption of
guilt that may flow from evidence uncontroverted by the defendant.
The state courts have divided on whether the Griffin principle
should be applied to disbarment proceedings. The question was answered in the negative in State v. Postorino,206 where the Wisconsin
supreme court interpreted Spevack as indicating only that "the taking
of the fifth amendment is not in itself a ground for disbarment." 207
The court relied on a state statute and state judicial precedent that
202. It may, for example, be more dangerous to allow a self-confessed murderer to
remain at large unpunished than it would be to allow an unfit person to continue
practicing law. The traditional solution to the problem presented by the murderer
would be to decide not to extend immunity, rather than to reclassify imprisonment
as a nonpenal sanction.
203. See text accompanying notes 10-24 supra.
204. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
205. 380 U.S. at 614.
206. 53 Wis. 2d 412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972).
207. 53 Wis. 2d at 416-17, 193 N.W.2d at 3 (emphasis added),
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characterized disciplinary proceedings as civil and concluded that in
such a proceeding the fifth amendment does not foreclose the court
from drawing an inference of guilt or an inference against the interest of the attorney who claims the privilege.208 In that case, there was
sufficient evidence without the inference to support the finding that
the attorney was not fit.
In contrast, the Michigan supreme court, in State Bar v. Woll, 209
held that the fifth amendment prohibited a prosecutor's comment,
in a disbarment proceeding, that an attorney's exercise of the privilege in the course of the proceeding indicated that he had engaged
in misconduct. The court stated that Michigan had long considered
disbarment proceedings to be quasi-criminal in character and noted:
"While not strictly a criminal prosecution, it is of that nature, and
the punishment, in prohibiting the party following his ordinary
occupation, would be severe and highly penal."210
These conclusions are contrary primarily because of the difference
in the respective state precedent regarding the characterization of
disciplinary proceedings. Both opinions are based on the premise
that in a civil case an opposing party's comment or a trier of fact's
negative inference based on a failure to testify would not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination. There is substantial authority
in support of this position211 from courts that have interpreted the
Griffen and Spevack cases as not going "so far as to absolutely proscribe the visitation of any and all consequences upon one who invokes the Fifth Amendment." 212 One court reasoned that "[t]he administration of justice and the search for truth demands that an
inference may be drawn...." 213 However, it is also possible to read
the Spevack and Griffen language, which forbids penalties that make
the exercise of the privilege "costly," more broadly so as to preclude
adverse comment or inference in all civil cases. At least one court
has accepted this reading and prohibited comments on the exercise
of the privilege in civil cases generally.214
208. 53 Wis. at 417, 193 N.W.2d at 3.
209. 387 Mich. 154, 194 N.W.2d 835 (1972).
210. 387 Mich. at 161, 194 N.W.2d at 838, quoting In re Baluss, 28 Mich. 507, 508
(1874).
211. E.g., Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 304-06, 249 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (1969)
(dicta: both comment and inference permissible); Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant
Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 231 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 50 N.J. 404, 235 A.2d 897 (1967)
(inference); Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970) (inference). A
number of other harsh consequences may follow from the assertion of the privilege
in a civil action. See text accompanying notes 215-17 infra; authorities cited in note
223 infra.
212. Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 533, 231 A.2d
854, 857, cert. denied, 50 N.J. 404, 235 A.2d 87 (1967).
213. Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 688, 176 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1970).
214. Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 51 Hawaii 649, 651-53, 466 P.2d 452, 454-55 (1970). Cf.
De Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320 (1967) (suit for alienation of affections; defendant
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Even if disbarment is characterized as civil for this purpose and
the state in question generally permits adverse comments or inferences in a civil proceeding, disbarment proceedings may be distinguished from other civil actions. Although the courts may not be
convinced that the severity of the consequences of disbarment is sufficient to characterize disbarment as a criminal proceeding, this severity
does suggest that disbarment is more costly than other civil sanctions,
such as dismissal of a cause of action215 or the striking of pleadings216
or testimony,217 where the greatest potential loss or penalty for asserting the privilege is generally a money judgment.
In addition, in disbarment proceedings it is the state, rather than
a private party to a civil suit, that seeks to turn the privilege into
evidence of misconduct. This is the sort of direct state action against
which the :fifth amendment privilege clearly protects.218 In civil
cases, the state action is more indirect, for it consists only of allowing
the private party to make negative comments about the assertion of
the privilege while enforcing his rights through the state judicial
machinery. 219
In addition, when the privilege to remain silent is asserted in a
civil proceeding the adverse private party is prejudiced. Arguably, he
ought to be allowed to compensate for the evidence made unavailable by his opponent by commenting upon or drawing an inference
from the other's silence. 220 It is less unjust to refuse to allow the state,
refused to answer complaint responsively, claiming privilege; default judgment held
unconstitutional penalty for assertion of privilege).
215. E.g., Minor v. Minor, 240 S.2d 301 (Fla. 1970); Stockham v. Stockham, 168 S.2d
320 (Fla. 1964).
216. E.g., Rubenstein v. Kleven, 150 F. Supp. 4'1 (D. Mass. 195'1).
217. E.g., Berner v. Schlesinger, 11 Misc. 2d 1024, 178 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1957),
a/jd., 6 App. Div. 2d 781, 175 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958).
218. Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to cstab•
lish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion
prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. • • • The Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amend•
ment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will ••.•
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964).
219. Enforcement of private rights through state judicial machinery may constitute
state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
220. Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121, 127-28 (1972)
(emphasis original):
It is often said that the rationale underlying the privilege is not protection of the
innocent, but rather preservation of the integrity of our legal system in which
the prosecution must bear the full burden of proof and in which all citizens are
guaranteed a "zone of privacy" from the government. Whatever relevance these
metaphysical concepts may have with respect to governmental inquiries, they arc
meaningless in the context of private litigation and damage claims being waged
by two private citizens. The privilege was conceived as a protection for the
accused against an inquisitorial-like system of accusers; it should be remembered
and applied as such. In civil cases involving only private parties, the government is
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which is intended to be limited by the privilege, to use such a compensating device in disbarment proceedings.
Furthermore, even though the majority of courts that have considered the problem have ruled that a plaintiff who claims the privilege in a civil action may be subject to severe disabilities, including
the dismissal of his actioi:J.,221 at least two courts have refused to allow
any inference to be drawn from the defendant's claim of the privilege.222 Allowing a party who actively seeks the aid of the court to
insist on the nondisclosure of essential aspects of the case seems more
unfair than allowing a party to assert the privilege while resisting
liability.223 The attorney in a disciplinary proceeding is in the latter
position.
Thus, even if disbarment is characterized as civil, it may be distinguished from other civil proceedings for purposes of prohibiting
inferences of guilt from the attorney's assertion of the privilege.
B. Disbarment for Lack of Frankness

Even if the state's counsel in a disbarment proceeding may not
urge directly that the exercise of the privilege indicates guilt of the
conduct charged, may the state nevertheless conclude that the accused
attorney's silence in itself indicates a lack of the frankness and candor
required of an officer of the court? And may such a finding of lack of
frankness and candor constitute grounds, alone or in conjunction
with other evidence, for disbarment?
There is a practical incompatibility between the duty to speak
candidly and the privilege to remain silent without penalty. Since
the mid-1950's there have been a number of split decisions on this
question that have involved public employees; some decisions place
priority on the individual's interests that are protected by the privilege, while others give priority to the state's interest in having frank
and candid employees.
The first such decision was Slochower v. Board of Education,224
in no way involved, and "privacy" is not the issue at hand: the more pertinent question, rather, is how to assure that the privilege is not applied so as to give one
citizen an unfair advantage over his fellow citizen.
221. See, e.g., Stockham v. Stockham, 168 S.2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Levine v. Bornstein,
13 Misc. 2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1958), afjd. mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183
N.Y.S.2d 868, affd., 6 N.Y.2d 892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959).
222, State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. McHenery, 69 S.2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 1953);
Berg v. Penttila, 173 Minn. 512, 217 N.W. 935 (1928). See generally Note, supra note
33, at 331-35.
223, Kaminsky, supra note 220, at 143-49; Comment, supra note 33, at 77-79; Note,
supra note 33, at 331-35. But see Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292
(1970).
224. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Justices Black and Douglas joined the Court's judgment
and opinion but also adhered to their dissents in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952), and Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), and to their
concurrences in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 350 U.S. at 559.
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which held that due process requirements were violated by the dismissal of a New York city college professor who refused to answer
questions put to him by a federal congressional committee about his
membership in the Communist Party. The New York court of appeals found that no inference of guilt had been drawn; 220 it held that
the discharge was permissible because it had been done in accordance
with the city charter, which validly imposed as a condition of employment the requirement that city employees not invoke the privilege before a legislative committee.226
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the employee's silence
had, in effect, been treated as a confession of guilt and made the basis
of his discharge. 227 The board of education had contended in its brief
that only two inferences could be drawn from the professor's assertion
of the privilege against self-incrimination: first, that his answers
would tend to prove his guilt; or, second, that he had falsely asserted
the privilege in order to avoid answering and had thus committed
perjury. 228 The Court found that the board had "seized upon his
claim of privilege ... and converted it through the use of § 903 [of
the New York City Charter] into a conclusive presumption of guilt.
Since no inference of guilt was possible from the claim before the
federal committee, the discharge [must fall] of its own weight as
wholly without support."229 The Supreme Court thus rejected the
New York court's conclusion and independently determined that the
effect of the charter provision was to treat silence as an admission of
guilt-a "sinister" inference.
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, however, the Court retreated
from the full implications of Slochower and emphasized instead Slochower's reference to a "sinister inference" of guilt. Retreating from
its willingness to determine the effect of a state statute independently,
the Court upheld several statutes that provided for disclosure or dismissal on the ground that in each case the state had interpreted the
statutes as basing dismissal solely on a violation of the duty of frankness and candor, rather than on any evidence of guilt or wrongdoing.
In Beilan v. Board of Education,239 Lerner v. Casey,231 and Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles,232 the Court approved the dismissals of, re225. Daniman v. :Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 3'1'7 (1954).
226. Daniman v. :Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538-39, 119 N.E.2d 373, 3'1'7-78 (1954).
227. 350 U.S. at 558.
228. 350 U.S. at 556-57.
229. 350 U.S. at 559.
230. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
231. 35'1 U.S. 468 (1958). The Court also held the federal privilege against self•
incrimination inapplicable to a refusal to answer in a state proceeding. 357 U.S. at 478.
This view was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
232. 362 U.S. 1 (1960),
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spectively, a school teacher, a subway conductor, and a social worker
on the basis of this reasoning.
The Spevack opinion, which did rely on Slochower,233 neither distinguished nor mentioned Lerner, Beilan, or Nelson. However,
Spevack overruled Cohen and reversed a New York court of appeals
decision, both of which relied in part on the violation of the duty of
frankness and candor.234 In Spevack the focus was not on the type of
inference permitted-either of guilt or of lack of the required candor
and frankness-but on the effect on the privilege. Imposition of disbarment as the price for asserting the privilege was impermissible
because it had the effect of watering down the protection of the
privilege.
Thus, under present case law the Spevack decision, though not
fully applicable to all public employees,235 is the controlling precedent for attorneys. In spirit, if not by holding, it appears to preclude
the use of an attorney's exercise of his privilege to disbar him, even
if the state justifies its action, not on exercise of the privilege per se
nor on a sinister inference of ·wrongdoing, but simply on a failure to
fulfill a duty of candor. However, the membership of the court has
changed significantly since the Spevack opinion; most significantly,
Justice Fortas, the major proponent of the distinction between attorneys and other public employees, has left.
Whether comment or inference of unfitness should be permitted
when it is based on lack of candor, rather than on actual guilt of the
offense charged, depends on the outcome of the balancing test that
the Court characteristically uses to determine the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.236 It would seem that, if the public
interest cannot justify compelling disclosure in the first instance, it
cannot justify reaching the same effect by converting privileged refusal to speak into evidence of a new misconduct. Thus, if the Spevack rule itself is to be maintained, it should not be undermined by
allowing adverse comment or presumptive inference to be based on
the assertion of the privilege.
233. 385 U.S. at 516.
234. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 121-27 (1961); In
1050, 213 N.E.2d 457, 458, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 126 (1965).
235. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
236. See text accompanying notes 43-61 supm.

Te

Spevack, 16 N.Y.2d 1048,

